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한줄요약:개소리

 The zombie problem is one of metaphors about the mind-body problem. Zombies in philosophy are exactly like us in every physical respect but they don’t have consciousness experiences. Zombies behave like human. We cannot distinguish zombies with people. I’ll connect this metaphor with Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy.

 Physicalism argues that physical factors determine all other facts in world including conscious experiences. According to physicalism, dualists should consider possibility of existence of zombies in the world because people can’t distinguish zombies with people. However, there is also an argument that reversely, if zombies are possible, it would mean that mental truths are not redescriptions of physical facts. It means that, physicalism is false. Dualists argue that if physicalism is true, a logically-possible world in which all physical facts are the same as those of the actual world must contain everything that exists in our actual world, in particular, conscious experience. We can conceive of a world physically indistinguishable from the world but there is no consciousness. Furthermore, we cannot explain the reason why it isn’t logically possible. For this reason, dualists argue that physicalism is false.

 Physicalists use phenomenal concepts to deal with this zombie problem. Dualists argue that the gap expressed in the idea that zombies are conceivable between the physical and the phenomenal brings with it an ontological gap. However, physicalists argue that there is only a conceptual gap. Phenomenal concepts just mislead us into supposing that there is an ontological gap when there isn’t an ontological gap.

 Merleau-Ponty focused on mind-body problem. He rejected the ‘subject-object’ approach, which can be expressed as a ‘ghost in the machine’ metaphor. Instead, he argued that body is not the object that mind controls as the subject and focused on body subjects. His argument is that without body subject, there will be no being-in-the world.

 Then, how can we connect the zombie problem with Merleau-Ponty? It looks like that Merleau-Ponty also rejects the possibility of existence of zombie because he rejected ‘ghost in a machine’ metaphor, in other words, ‘subject-object’ approach. However, we can use Merleau-Ponty’s ‘space’ concept to continue thought experience with the zombie problem. According to Merleau-Ponty there are many spaces that one subject cannot travel continuously.  Then is there a space that has zombies, physical bodies without conscious experiences? Maybe it can be said that there are zombies in the Cinema space or the novel space. However, zombies in those spaces are not philosophical zombies. We should imagine the space that has zombies which are exactly like to our physical shapes.

 Zombies have a physical body and act as a human who has conscious experiences. Does it mean that Zombies may have a habituation which is important in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy? According to Merleau-Ponty, body is habitual which means that we can move just without ‘representation’. According to Merleau-Ponty we subjectize body through habitualization and, there can’t be negotiation of space without body-subject. Then do zombies can act as a human without representation? Zombies act and behave as human without consciousness. That means, all acts and behaviors that zombies show has same background although we can’t say that whether it’s all calculated or without any calculation. It means that, zombies do not have representation. They also don’t have habitualization because they don’t need to and they can’t. All their acts and behaviors will be done with same mechanism. They can’t negotiate with space because their body can’t habitualize. It denies my premise; the space that philosophical zombies exist. So I conclude that according to Merleau-Ponty, possibility of existence zombies is denied.

번역기 돌려봐야징. 히히.

zombies have a physical body and blahblah
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